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I. Introduction
On January 30, 1985, an eighteen-year-old Queens, New
York nursing home aide was attacked and sexually assaulted.'
She described her attacker as a white male with a full beard, a
reddish-blonde "Afro" and a web-like cross tattooed on his left
hand.2 After chasing fruitless leads for several months, the in-
vestigation of the assault came to a halt, and on November 15,
1985, the case was marked "no longer active."3 Six months
* M.A., J.D., Ph.D. Candidate, Clinical Professor of Law, Director of Clinical
Legal Studies Program, Albany Law School, 80 New Scotland Avenue, Albany,
New York 12208. Thanks to my husband Will DeRuve for his help and support
and to my research assistant Patricia Kilgannon.
1. William Falk, DNA and the Crime He Didn't Commit, NEWSDAY, Nov. 22,
1992, at 6.
2. Id. This type of tattoo, called a "Pachecko cross" was not a rare tattoo.
They were popular among motorcycle gangs and drug dealers in the 1960s accord-
ing to Dr. Michael Baden, an expert on tattoos. Id.
3. Id.
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later, New York City police began looking for Leonard Callace
who had been charged with an unrelated crime, criminal mis-
chief, and who had failed to make his court appearance. When
police investigators learned that Callace had a reddish beard
and a "Pachecko cross" tattooed on his hand and that Callace
lived in the vicinity of the aide's attack, they became convinced
that Callace was the attacker.4
Certain of Callace's guilt, investigators called the victim in
late June, eighteen months after the rape, to view a photo-
graphic array. The photographic array contained six photo-
graphs in which five of the men pictured had mustaches and
only one, Callace, had a full beard.5 Police testified that the vic-
tim pointed to the photograph of Callace and said, "That's
4. Id. The crime had been investigated by Detective Brian McDonald and
Detective Kevin Harty. Harty was informed by another investigator of Callace's
description and told McDonald. McDonald later testified, "I said, Kevin, this is the
guy. I know it... We were convinced in our minds it was him." Id.
5. Id. Courts generally require that a photographic array depict individuals
similar in appearance and matching the description given by eyewitnesses. If only
the picture of the suspect matches the description given by the eyewitness, courts
have held that the photographic array violates that person's due process rights
because it enhances the chance of misidentification. See United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218, 233 (1967) (providing numerous instances of suggestive procedures
which have the dissimilar effect of singling out the suspect); Salam v. Lockhart,
874 F.2d 525, 529 (8th Cir.) (finding identification procedures were not impermis-
sibly suggestive when the individuals in a photographic display and line-up were
of the same race, possessed similar physical features, and were alike in size, age,
and dress), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 898 (1989); United States v. Langley, 848 F.2d
152, 153 (11th Cir. 1988) (concluding neither photographic array nor line-ups were
suggestive when court found identification procedures were conducted with great
care, to insure that persons who had physical characteristics similar to the defend-
ant's were displayed to four eyewitnesses). But see Cikora v. Dagger, 840 F.2d 893,
896-97 (11th Cir. 1988) (finding photographic line-up was not impermissibly sug-
gestive even though suspect's photograph was only one with height markings, sus-
pect was the only non-Hispanic, and suspect had less facial hair than the other
men); United States v. Monks, 774 F.2d 945, 956-57 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding even if
line-ups were unduly suggestive by failing to include pictures of other persons with
physical characteristics similar to defendant, due process was not violated because
of the reliability of the witness identification).
Social-science research also demonstrates that if one photograph stands out, it
is more apt to being selected by the eyewitness and, therefore, the rate of misiden-
tification is increased. See generally Robert Buckhout, Eyewitness Testimony, 231
Sci. Am. 23 (1974); Anthony N. Doob & Hershi M. Kirshenbaum, Bias in Police
Lineups: Partial Remembering, 1 J. POLICE Sci. 287 (1973); Felice Levine & June
Tapp, The Psychology of Criminal Identification: The Gap from Wade to Kirby, 121
U. PA. L. REV. 1079 (1973); Gary L. Wells et al., Guidelines for Empirically Assess-
ing the Fairness of a Lineup, 3 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 285 (1979).
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him."6 On July 31, 1986, police arrested Callace and called the
victim to the precinct to view a line-up. A detective told the
victim that the person whose photograph she had picked was in
the line-up.7 Of the six suspects in the line-up, Callace was
again the only one who had a beard.8 Furthermore, Callace was
the only suspect in the line-up who was asked to say the phrase,
"Get out of the car now."9 The victim once again identified Cal-
lace as her attacker.
The prosecution of Callace was based almost exclusively on
the eyewitness identification. The prosecution introduced no
physical evidence linking Callace to the crime.'0 The victim tes-
tified at trial that, even though it was nearly two years after the
crime, she was absolutely certain that Callace was the man who
had attacked her." The defense did not call an expert witness
to testify about the unreliability of eyewitness identification.
In less than ninety minutes, the jury found Callace guilty of
the attack. In February, 1987, he was sentenced to a term of
twenty-five to fifty years in the state penitentiary. Jurors inter-
viewed later said that the victim's absolute confidence in her
6. Falk, supra note 1, at 6. The victim contradicted police testimony when she
apparently testified that she had simply said that the attacker had a beard and
had not said, "That's him," as police testified. Id.
7. Id. Social-science research indicates that telling a witness that the suspect
is present in a line-up significantly increazes the chance of false identification.
ELIZABETH LoFrus, EYEwiTNEss TESTIMONY 144 (1979); Brian L. Cutler et al., The
Reliability of Eyewitness Identification, 11 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 233, 244 (1987) (con-
cluding that biased instructions reduced the accuracy of identifications and signifi-
cantly increased the number of false identifications).
The Supreme Court has also recognized that this increases the chance of mis-
identification: "The chance of misidentification is also heightened if the police in-
dicate to the witness that they have evidence that one of the persons pictured
committed the crime." Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 383 (1968).
8. Falk, supra note 1, at 6.
9. Id. The detective testified that he had all six of the suspects state the
phrase but the victim twice testified that only Callace was asked by police to state
the phrase. Id.
10. Id. The prosecutor's case was so weak that the prosecution offered to al-
low Callace to plead to a misdemeanor in return for four months in county jail. Id.
11. Id. Social-science research indicates that after one year there is very little
ability to recognize a person with whom one had a brief encounter. See Lorus,
supra note 7, at 68-70; Brian L. Cutler et al., Unconfounding the Effects of Contex-
tual Cues on Eyewitness Identification Accuracy, 1 Soc. BEHAV. 113, 131-32 (1986);
Frances L. Krouse, Effects of Pose, Pose Change, and Delay on Face Recognition
Performance, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 651, 651 (1981).
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identification swayed them to convict. 12 For nearly six years,
Callace staunchly maintained his innocence. On October 19,
1992, a judge told Callace that he was free to go. 13 DNA tests
had finally revealed that Callace could not have been the at-
tacker. How could the eyewitness, who was so certain, have
been so wrong? What happened to the procedural safeguards
that were meant to protect an innocent person from wrongful
conviction? Why would twelve jurors convict on the strength of
eyewitness identification alone?
Most people believe that eyewitness identification is one of
the most reliable forms of evidence that can be produced against
a defendant. 4 Because of that belief, empirical studies have
shown that jurors place an enormous amount of faith on eyewit-
ness testimony.15 The courts have also recognized the influen-
tial impact eyewitness identifications have on juries. 6 As
12. Falk, supra note 1, at 6. One of the jurors who was recently interviewed
said, "I certainly had my doubts.., but I felt it would have been a mistake to let
someone go who had committed this crime ... [because] the girl seemed so sure.
She was very convincing." Id.
13. Id.
14. LoFrus, supra note 7, at 19.
15. See Elizabeth F. Loftus, Restructuring Memory: Incredible Eyewitness, 8
PSYCHOL. TODAY 116, 118 (1974). In an experimental setting, jurors were given
information about a crime and then presented evidence equally weighted in favor
of the defendant and the prosecution. Only 18% of the jurors voted for conviction.
When the testimony of an eyewitness was added, 72% ofjurors voted for guilt. Id.;
see also ELIZABETH F. LoFTus & JAMES M. DOYLE, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CML &
CRIMINAL 25-26 (1987) (study demonstrated that eyewitness testimony was given
more weight than any other type of evidence, including testimony from handwrit-
ing, fingerprint, and other experts); Gary L. Wells et al., Accuracy, Confidence and
Juror Perceptions in Eyewitness Identification 64 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 440, 446
(1979). After a mock theft, three eyewitnesses testified in a mock trial as to the
circumstances of the theft and the identity of the perpetrator. Jurors were asked
for their reactions and results indicated that they tended to believe the eyewitness
testimony about 80% of the time. Results also revealed that jurors tended to be-
lieve those witnesses who made the identification in a highly confident manner
even though their identification was inaccurate. Id.
16. See Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 120 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) ("[J]uries unfortunately are often unduly receptive to such [identification] evi-
dence."); United States v. Langford, 802 F.2d 1176, 1182 (9th Cir. 1986) ("[J]uries
almost unquestioningly accept eyewitness testimony."); United States v. Greene,
591 F.2d 471, 475 (8th Cir. 1979) ("[T]he in-court testimony of an eyewitness can
be devastatingly persuasive."); United States v. Russell, 532 F.2d 1063, 1067 (6th
Cir. 1976) ("[O1f all the evidence that may be presented to a jury, a witness' in-
court statement that he is the one is probably the most dramatic and persuasive.").
818 [Vol. 13:815
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Justice Brennan stated in his dissent in Watkins v. Sowders:17
"[E]yewitness identification evidence has a powerful impact on
juries. Juries seem most receptive to, and not inclined to dis-
credit, testimony of a witness who states that he saw the de-
fendant commit the crime." 18
Evidentiary rules allowing juries to convict solely on the ba-
sis of an eyewitness identification institutionally reinforce the
credibility afforded to eyewitness testimony.' 9 However, while
a great deal of credibility is given to eyewitness identification,
empirical studies have shown that eyewitness identification can
actually be extremely unreliable.20 Given the weight afforded
eyewitness identification, it is not surprising that studies have
shown that approximately fifty percent of those wrongly con-
victed were convicted based on eyewitness identification evi-
dence. 2' This makes mistaken identity the factor most often
responsible for wrongful conviction.22
What makes eyewitness identification unreliable? When
crime victims attempt to recall faces of strangers they have seen
for only a brief period of time, many factors affect their ability
to accurately remember what they have seen. Factors that may
affect the reliability of the identification include: lighting condi-
tions; the duration of the event; violence; the age, sex and race
of the perpetrator; the length of time between the event and the
identification and the acquisition of post-event information that
may distort the memory. 23
In addition to these factors, special problems exist with re-
spect to the identification of a person from a photographic ar-
17. 449 U.S. 341 (1981).
18. Id. at 352 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
19. Corroboration is not required to support a conviction based upon eyewit-
ness identification testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552
(D.C. Cir. 1972); People v. DuByk, 285 A.D.2d 1025, 139 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1st Dep't),
affd, 309 N.Y. 833, 130 N.E.2d 621 (1955).
20. See generally LoF-rus, supra note 7; LoFrus & DOYLE, supra note 15.
21. EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT, at xiii (1932) (Borchard
reviewed 65 cases of wrongful convictions and found that 45% were the result of
mistaken eyewitness identification.); Arye Rattner, Convicted But Innocent, 12 L.
& Hum. BEHAV. 283, 289 (1988) (Rattner studied 200 cases of wrongfully convicted
persons and found that 52.3% of the convictions resulted from faulty eyewitness
identification.).
22. Rattner, supra note 21, at 292.
23. LoFrus, supra note 7, at 123-29.
1994] 819
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ray. After a crime has been committed, it is often standard
police procedure to construct a photographic array to show to a
witness. 24 One danger inherent in the reliability of an identifi-
cation from such an array relates to the expectation on the part
of the witness that the suspect is, in fact, in the photographic
array. The eyewitness, believing the suspect is present in the
array, will often identify the person that looks most like the
criminal, rather than choosing no one. 25
The number of photographs in an array26 and the physical
characteristics of the participants are also factors bearing on
the reliability of a photographic identification.27 But in addi-
tion, the photograph is merely a two-dimensional depiction of a
person. Often a witness cannot discern height and weight accu-
rately from a photograph. If the photograph is old and no
longer accurately depicts its subject, it may also lead to a false
identification. 28
A subsequent corporeal line-up, which includes a suspect
already selected from a photographic array, compounds the
problems inherent in the use of photographs by creating what
24. Id. at 144; PATRICK M. WALL, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL
CASES 66-68 (1965).
25. LOFTUS, supra note 7, at 144; Buckhout, supra note 5, at 30; Robert
Buckhout et al., Determinants of Eyewitness Performance on a Lineup, 4 BULL.
PSYCHONOMIC Soc'Y 191, 192 (1974); Robert Buckhout et al., Eyewitness Identifica-
tion: Effects of Suggestion and Bias in Identification from Photographs, 4 BULL.
PSYCHONOMIC Soc'Y 71, 71-72 (1975).
26. United States v. Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d 934, 974 (2d Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 2811 (1991); LoFTus, supra note 7, at 144.
27. Courts generally require that the photographic array depict persons of
similar race and features to admit pretrial identification. See United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 233 (1967); Salam v. Lockhart, 874 F.2d 525 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 898 (1989); United States v. Langley, 848 F.2d 152 (11th Cir.
1988). But see Cikora v. Dagger, 840 F.2d 893 (11th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Monks, 774 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1985).
Social-science research demonstrates that high similarity line-ups increase
identification accuracy. See BRIAN R. CLIFFORD & RAY BULL, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
PERSON IDENTIFICATION 194 (1978); Buckhout, supra note 5, at 26; Doob & Kir-
shenbaum, supra note 5 at 289; see also Felice J. Levine & June Louin Tapp, The
Psychology of Criminal Identification: The Gap from Wade to Kirby, 121 U. PA. L.
REV. 1079 (1973).
28. WALL, supra note 24, at 68-70. Photographs depicting persons with differ-
ent expressions (i.e., smiling vs. nonsmiling) have also been seen to play a role in
recognition memory. Ruth Ellen Galper & Julian Hochberg, Recognition Memory
for Photographs of Faces, 84 AM. J. PSYCHOL. 351, 351, 353-54 (1971).
820 [Vol. 13:815
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researchers have called a photo-biased line-up. 29 After being
shown a photographic array, a witness will often be asked to
view a corporeal line-up. The witness often chooses the person
who looks most familiar, believing that the person is familiar
because of the crime, when the familiarity actually relates back
to the recently viewed photograph and not to the crime.30 Stud-
ies have demonstrated that viewing a suspect's photograph af-
ter a crime but prior to a corporeal line-up dramatically
increases the chances of identification of that particular suspect
at the subsequent line-up.31 This finding casts serious doubt on
the reliability of pretrial and in-court identifications when a
photographic array has first been displayed to the witness.
Because of the problems inherent in eyewitness identifica-
tion of suspects, especially through the use of photographs,
courts have attempted to construct procedural safeguards to
protect against false identification. This article outlines the ap-
plication of current procedural safeguards to protect an accused
who has been the subject of a pretrial identification based on a
photographic array. It also explores the "fit" between the
predictors of reliability, as demonstrated by empirical studies,
and the rulings on reliability made by the courts. Would Leo-
nard Callace have been convicted if the jury had been made
aware of the possible problems affecting the reliability of the
eyewitness identification in his case? Effective challenges on
behalf of an accused must be based on the law, but an effective
advocate must be aware of the empirical findings and make an
effort to get this information before the tribunal whenever
appropriate.
29. Loprus, supra note 7, at 150.
30. Id. at 151; Elizabeth F. Loftus & Edith Greene, Warning: Even Memory for
Faces Can Be Contagious, 4 L. & HuM. BEHAV. 323, 332-34 (1980).
31. A study completed in 1977 demonstrated this danger inherent in viewing
a photograph during the interval between a crime and a corporeal line-up. Wit-
nesses viewed two groups of "criminals" for 25 seconds and later that evening were
asked to identify the "criminals" from 15 mug shots. One week later they were
asked to identify the criminals in a line-up. Of the persons whose mug shots had
not been displayed, eight percent were falsely identified. But of those whose faces
that appeared in the mug shots, their chances of being falsely identified in the line-
up rose to 20%. Evan Brown et al., Memory for Faces and the Circumstances of
Encounter, 62 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 311, 314 (1977).
19941 821
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II. Procedural Safeguards
While constitutional challenges to pretrial identification
through line-ups and show-ups may be based on both the de-
fendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel and on Fifth
Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process, 32
challenges to a photographic line-up are based solely on a due
process analysis.33 The right to counsel in the line-up/show-up
context begins as soon as adversarial, judicial criminal proceed-
ings are initiated "by way of formal charge, preliminary hear-
ing, indictment, information, or arraignment."34 This right to
counsel is based upon the "potential substantial prejudice to de-
fendant's rights [which] inheres in the particular confrontation
and the ability of counsel to help avoid that prejudice."35 Thus,
the rationale for extending the right to counsel to line-ups and
show-ups lies in the "trial-like" confrontation between the ac-
cused and the witness. Counsel serves as an observer "to pre-
serve the defendant's basic right to a fair trial .... "36 At a
photographic display, however, the defendant is not present,
nor does he have the right to be.37 Because there is no actual
confrontation between the accused and the witness, the
Supreme Court has held that the accused has no right to coun-
sel at a photographic identification, whether it occurs before or
after the initiation of criminal prosecution. 38 Thus, any chal-
lenge to a photographic pretrial identification must be based on
the requirements of due process, using a totality of circum-
stances analysis.39
III. The Due Process Standard
The Supreme Court, in Stovall v. Denno,40 held that a pre-
or post-indictment identification procedure that is conducted in
32. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S.
263 (1967); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
33. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1967).
34. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972).
35. Wade, 388 U.S. at 227.
36. Id.
37. Ash, 413 U.S. at 317.
38. Id. at 321.
39. Id; Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 107-14 (1977); Simmons v. United
States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1973); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198-99 (1972).
40. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
[Vol. 13:815822
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a manner that is "so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to
irreparable mistaken identification" violates the due process
rights of an accused. 41 The totality of circumstances must be
examined to determine whether the accused was deprived of
due process. 42 The Stovall Court found that, on the facts of the
case, the one-on-one confrontation did not violate due process,
emphasizing that the critical condition of the injured witness
justified a show-up in her hospital room and that the victim was
the only one who could exonerate Stovall.43 Though the proce-
dure was suggestive, exigent circumstances made it necessary
and did not produce a likelihood of misidentification. 44
While Stovall involved a one-on-one show-up, one year later
the rule set out in Stovall was applied to the display of a single
photograph of a suspect in Simmons v. United States.45 The
Court in Simmons discussed the hazards of using photographs
for identification purposes, identifying some of the situations
the Court would find to be "suggestive":
This danger [that the witness may make an incorrect identifica-
tion] will be increased if the police display to the witness only the
picture of a single individual who generally resembles the person
he saw, or if they show him the pictures of several persons among
which the photograph of a single such individual recurs or is in
some way emphasized. The chance of misidentification is also
heightened if the police indicate to the witness that they have
other evidence that one of the persons pictured committed the
crime. Regardless of how the initial misidentification comes
about, the witness thereafter is apt to retain in his memory the
image of the photograph rather than of the person actually seen,
reducing the trustworthiness of subsequent lineup or courtroom
identification. 46
However, in the face of these hazards, the Court expressed
approval of the use of photographic identification and adopted
the Stovall rule with respect to admissibility of this type of evi-
dence. Thus, pretrial photographic identification and subse-
quent in-court identification based on pretrial procedures must
41. Id. at 301-02.
42. Id. at 302.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
46. Id. at 384.
1994] 823
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be excluded "only if the photographic identification procedure
was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very sub-
stantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification."47 In apply-
ing this standard to the facts in the Simmons case, the Court
found that, although the display of a single photograph was
suggestive, it was justified by exigent circumstances since the
perpetrators were at large and agents had to act quickly to try
to identify them.48
In both Stovall and Simmons, the Court emphasized the
necessity of the procedure and the reliability of the identifica-
tion as factors justifying a suggestive identification procedure.
However, after Simmons, it was unclear whether a suggestive
procedure could only be justified if both factors were present. In
other words, if a procedure was highly suggestive yet reliable, is
it nevertheless inadmissible if no exigent circumstances were
present to make the procedure "necessary"? This question was
addressed in two subsequent Supreme Court cases.
In Neil v. Biggers,49 a rape victim was called to the police
station to view a suspect seven months after the offense. 50 Ap-
parently the police were unable to find persons fitting the sus-
pect's description, so instead of a line-up, they conducted a
show-up, in which the victim identified the suspect as the rap-
ist.51 The defendant claimed that the show-up was clearly sug-
gestive and should be excluded, regardless of the reliability of
the identification, since the police did not make an effort to put
together an adequate line-up and there were no exigent circum-
stances justifying the show-up.52
The Court declined to constitutionalize a strict rule requir-
ing exigent circumstances to justify the suggestive identifica-
tion procedure. 53 The central question, according to the Biggers
Court, was "whether under the 'totality of the circumstances'
the identification was reliable even though the confrontation
47. Id.
48. Id. at 385. The Court also determined that there was little chance that
the procedure gave rise to misidentification. Id.
49. 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
50. Id. at 195.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 199.
824 [Vol. 13:815
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procedure was suggestive."54 The Court determined that in
cases where the likelihood of misidentification threatens the
fairness of the trial, the defendant's due process rights would be
violated unless the evidence is excluded.55 With respect to relia-
bility, the Court set out five factors to consider in evaluating the
likelihood of misidentification:
As indicated by our cases, the factors to be considered in evaluat-
ing the likelihood of misidentification include the opportunity of
the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the wit-
ness's degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness's prior de-
scription of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by
the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between
the crime and the confrontation. 56
Applying these factors to the Biggers facts, the Court found that
the identification was so reliable that it was admissible, despite
the fact that the procedure used was unnecessarily suggestive.57
In deciding Biggers, the Court noted that a strict rule of
exclusion would not make sense because the underlying identi-
fication procedure in Biggers occurred prior to the Stovall rul-
ing.58 Thus, at the time the procedure was carried out, there
was no indication that such a suggestive procedure might lead
to exclusion of the evidence.5 9 Therefore, by implication, the
Court left open the question of whether a strict rule requiring
exclusion for any unnecessarily suggestive post-Stovall proce-
dures would be constitutionalized.
In 1977, the United States Supreme Court granted certio-
rari in Manson v. Brathwaite60 to address the question left open
in Biggers - whether a strict rule excluding evidence would be
required when the unnecessarily suggestive pretrial identifica-
tion procedure took place post-Stovall. In Manson, an under-
cover police officer went to an apartment to make a drug
purchase. 61 After the officer knocked, a man came to the door
54. Id. at 200.
55. Id. at 199.
56. Id. at 199-200.
57. Id. at 201.
58. Id. at 199.
59. Id.
60. 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
61. Id. at 100.
1994] 825
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and opened it twelve to eighteen inches.62 The police officer
purchased two glycine bags of narcotics through the door. 63
The officer returned to the station house and described the
seller to two other police officers who produced a single photo-
graph of a suspect matching the description of the seller.64 Af-
ter viewing the single photograph, the police officer who made
the buy identified it as the seller.65 No explanation was offered
at trial for the officers' failure "to use a photographic array or to
conduct a line-up." 66
The lower court held that the identification evidence should
have been excluded, regardless of reliability, because the exami-
nation of a single photograph was unnecessary and suggestive
[hereinafter the "per se approach]. 6 7 The state conceded before
the Supreme Court that the procedure was both suggestive and
unnecessary. However, it claimed that the Biggers analysis
should be applied, permitting the admission of identification ev-
idence if, despite the suggestive and unnecessary aspects, the
out-of-court identification was nonetheless reliable [hereinafter
the "totality of circumstances approach"]. 6
In determining whether to follow the totality of circum-
stances approach or the per se approach, the Court balanced
three factors: (1) the Court's concern with the problems of eye-
witness identification; (2) the deterrent effect on police behav-
ior; and (3) the effect on the administration of justice.69 The
Court concluded that both approaches were responsive to the
first two concerns, but that the totality of circumstances ap-
proach was clearly superior with respect to the administration
of justice.70 The per se approach would deny the trier of fact
reliable evidence, the denial of which might result in "the guilty
going free."71 The totality of circumstances approach, on the
other hand, would promote justice by allowing use of reliable
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 101.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 102.
67. Id. at 103-04.
68. Id. at 109.
69. Id. at 111.
70. Id. at 111-12.
71. Id. at 112.
826 [Vol. 13:815
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identification testimony resulting in a fair conviction of the
guilty.72
The Court concluded that "reliability is the linchpin in de-
termining the admissibility of identification testimony for both
pre- and post-Stovall" identification procedures. 73 Reliability is
to be determined using the factors set out in Biggers.74 In ap-
plying the Biggers factors to the Manson facts, the Court found
that the identification procedure was so reliable that the identi-
fication was admissible, despite the fact that the procedure was
highly suggestive and not justified by exigent circumstances. 75
Through this line of cases, the Supreme Court has fash-
ioned a two-pronged test for the exclusion of eyewitness identifi-
cations based on impermissibly suggestive pretrial
identification procedures. The first prong involves the determi-
nation of whether the identification procedure was highly sug-
gestive. 76 If it was not, evidence of the pretrial identification is
admissible, as is any in-court identification, whether based on
the pretrial procedure or independently based.77 Even if the
pretrial identification is found to have been highly suggestive,
the identification evidence is still not automatically excluded.
The second prong requires that a court make further in-
quiry as to whether, in light of the totality of circumstances, the
suggestiveness is such that a likelihood of misidentification ex-
ists.78 If, after applying the five Biggers factors, the identifica-
tion appears to have been reliable, a court should admit it,
regardless of its impermissibly suggestive nature.79 Thus, after
Biggers and Manson, it seems clear that the Supreme Court will
not require that exigent circumstances be present to justify the
use of a suggestive procedure. While exigent circumstances
may still be used to justify and support a suggestive procedure,
72. Id. at 113.
73. Id. at 114.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 117.
76. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968).
77. Id.
78. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 110 (1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S.
188, 199 (1972).
79. Manson, 432 U.S. at 114-16; Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-200.
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necessity is not a prerequisite to the admissibility of eyewitness
identification testimony.80
The cases outlined in the section that follows, section IV,
are illustrative of the types of photographic displays that courts
have found to be suggestive. As the Second Circuit in United
States v. Maldonado-Rivera81 stated: "The fairness of a photo-
graphic array depends on a number of factors, including the size
of the array, the manner of presentation by the officers, and the
array's contents."82 Broadly speaking, any manner of display
that tends to emphasize a particular suspect's photograph or
causes the witness to focus on a particular photograph may be
found to be impermissibly suggestive.8 3 Additionally, an array
that is too small8 4 or one that includes photographs grossly dis-
similar from the suspect's description may also be found to be
suggestive.85
As discussed previously, the mere fact that a photographic
array is suggestive does not mean the identification based on
the array is inadmissible. Even if the manner or content of a
photographic array is suggestive, to determine whether the
identification is admissible, the court must still determine
whether the identification is reliable. Section V describes
trends in how the five Biggers factors, the Supreme Court's in-
dicia of reliability, have been applied and analyzed by the
courts.
IV. Suggestiveness of the Procedure
A. Size of the Array
Social-science research has demonstrated the unreliability
of an identification made after the display of a single photo-
80. Manson, 432 U.S. at 116.
81. 922 F.2d 934 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2811 (1991).
82. Id. at 974.
83. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968).
84. Id. at 383; Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 111 (1977).
85. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 233 (1967); see also Salam v.
Lockhart, 874 F.2d 525, 529 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 898 (1989); United
States v. Langley, 848 F.2d 152, 153 (lth Cir. 1988). But see Cikora v. Dugger,
840 F.2d 893, 897 (11th Cir. 1988); United States v. Monks, 774 F.2d 945, 956-57
(9th Cir. 1985).
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graph.8 6 As stated above, the Supreme Court has also recog-
nized the danger of suggestiveness when only one picture is
displayed.87 Thus, most courts routinely find that the display of
a single photograph is one of the most suggestive and, hence,
objectionable methods of identification.8 Researchers have fur-
ther demonstrated the danger of misidentification when repeat
images of a single suspect are shown to a witness.8 9 Likewise,
the Supreme Court has also recognized that the repeated show-
ing of a particular picture of an individual in a series of arrays
reinforces the image of the photograph in the mind of the
viewer, causing the procedure to be highly suggestive.90 Thus,
courts have generally condemned procedures in which multiple
photographs of the defendant appeared in a single array.91
86. See LoFrus, supra note 7, at 148-50; WALL, supra note 24, at 74-80 (citing
case studies where defendants were victims of false identifications after witnesses
were shown single photographs); Wells et al., supra note 5, at 286.
87. Manson, 432 U.S. at 111; Simmons, 390 U.S. at 383.
88. See, e.g., Robinson v. Clarke, 939 F.2d 573, 576 (8th Cir. 1991); Williams v.
Armontrout, 877 F.2d 1376 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1082 (1990);
United States v. Givens, 767 F.2d 574, 581 (9th Cir. 1985); Bloodworth v. Hopper,
539 F.2d 1382, 1383 (5th Cir. 1976); Wicks v. Lockhart, 569 F. Supp. 549, 553 (E.D.
Ark. 1983). But see Herrera v. Collins, 904 F.2d 944, 946-47 (5th Cir.) (holding the
display of single photograph to dying police officer was justified due to exigent
circumstances), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 925 (1990).
89. Using multiple photographs of the same individual in an array increases
the probability that the individual will be selected and also may lead the witness to
think that the individual looks familiar because of the crime when in fact the indi-
vidual becomes familiar because of the repeat images. LoFrus, supra note 7, at
150-51; Loftus & Greene, supra note 30, at 332-34 (1980); Brown et al., supra note
31, at 314.
90. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 383 (1968). The Supreme Court
stated that the danger of misidentification:
will be increased if the police ... show [the witness] pictures of several per-
sons among which the photograph of a single such individual recurs ....
Regardless of how the initial misidentification comes about, the witness
thereafter is apt to retain in his memory the image of the photograph rather
than of the person actually seen, reducing the trustworthiness of subse-
quent line-up or courtroom identification.
Id. at 383-84.
91. United States v. Myers, 892 F.2d 642, 647 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding where
array included only three photographs, two of which were of the defendant, the
procedure was unnecessarily suggestive though admitted the in-court identifica-
tion as reliable); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1986) (where one wit-
ness was shown four or five photographs, all of which were of the defendant and a
second witness was shown 12 photographs, four of which were of the defendant),
cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1059 (1987); United States v. Mears, 614 F.2d 1175, 1177
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On the other hand, courts have allowed several types of
procedures that would seem to contradict the rule against using
repeat images of a single suspect. At least five circuits have
held that inclusion of the same suspect's picture in two different
arrays, even inclusion of the same picture, is constitutionally
permissible. 92 The courts of appeal in the Eighth and Ninth
Circuits have also allowed pretrial procedures consisting of both
a photographic line-up and corporeal line-up in which the de-
fendant was the only person common to both procedures. In
United States v. Briley,93 the Eighth Circuit, after reviewing the
photo spread and the picture of the line-up, concluded that "the
fact that Briley was the only person displayed in both the
photospread and the lineup [does not make] the identification
procedures per se suggestive."94 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit, in
United States v. Davenport,95 found that "[t]he fact that Daven-
port was the only individual common to the photospread and
the lineup cannot, without further indicia of suggestiveness,
render the lineup conducive to irreparable misidentification." 96
It appears likely that a photographic display containing
multiple photographs of a particular suspect will be found to be
highly suggestive. However, the use of a series of identification
procedures in which a particular suspect appears a single time
in each, but is the only person common to all, is allowable. This
(8th Cir. 1980) (where two photographs of defendant appeared in a single array of
seven photographs).
92. United States v. Maguire, 918 F.2d 254, 265 (1st Cir. 1990) (where same
photograph of suspect was included in two different arrays), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
1421 (1991); United States v. Dowling, 855 F.2d 114, 116-18 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding
a pretrial procedure was not so suggestive as to render the photographic identifica-
tion inadmissible where defendant's photograph was repeated in successive photo-
graph arrays); United States v. Bagley, 772 F.2d 482, 493 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding
it was not impermissibly suggestive to show the witness two sets of photographs in
which only the defendant's photograph was common to both sets); Perron v. Perrin,
742 F.2d 669, 675 (1st Cir. 1984) (holding that the identification procedure was not
impermissibly suggestive where a photograph of the defendant appeared in the
first array, followed two weeks later by a second array in which the defendant's
photograph appeared again); United States ex rel. Kubat v. Thieret, 679 F. Supp.
788, 801 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (holding that the identification procedure was not imper-
missibly suggestive where defendant's photograph was only one used in three suc-
cessive photograph line-ups), affd, 867 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1989).
93. 726 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1984).
94. Id. at 1306-07.
95. 753 F.2d 1460 (9th Cir. 1985).
96. Id. at 1463.
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result is inconsistent with empirical findings concerning the re-
liability of the identification procedures. 97
B. Manner of Display
1. Collaboration Between Witnesses
Researchers have demonstrated that collaboration between
witnesses increases the rate of misidentification. 98 Courts have
likewise disapproved of any consultation between witnesses
who are viewing a photographic array or line-up.99 The pre-
ferred procedure is to keep witnesses apart while they view pho-
tographic spreads. 100
In United States v. Bagley,'0° a police officer passed a car
matching the description of the get-away car involved in a bank
robbery that had just occurred in the vicinity, and the officer
briefly observed the driver. 0 2 Later that day, the officer and
the bank teller jointly viewed two sets of photographs, and the
police officer saw the teller choose the photograph of the defend-
ant, Bagley.10 3 Later at the trial, the police officer identified
Bagley as the person driving the get-away car. 0 4 In holding
that the joint viewing was unnecessarily suggestive, the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed the general rule
about witness collaboration by declaring that, "A joint confron-
tation is a disapproved identification procedure." 10 5
97. LoFrus, supra note 7, at 150; Brown et al., supra note 31, at 312.
98. Levine & Tapp, supra note 27, at 1112-14.
99. See Escalera v. Coombe, 826 F.2d 185, 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. granted
and vacated on other grounds, 484 U.S. 1054 (1988), on remand, 852 F.2d 45 (2d
Cir.), on remand, 697 F. Supp. 120 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); United States v. Field, 625
F.2d 862, 870 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Bridgefourth, 538 F.2d 1251, 1253
(6th Cir. 1976); United States v. Wilson, 435 F.2d 403, 405 (D.C. Cir. 1970). But
see Barron v. Newsome, 712 F. Supp. 915, 918 (N.D. Ga. 1988) (holding that proce-
dure was not unduly suggestive where witness viewed two sets of photographs in
same room but could not see which photograph the other witness chose); Tavarez
v. LeFevre, 649 F. Supp. 526, 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that allowing three
witnesses to view photographs simultaneously did not render procedure unduly
suggestive).
100. Wilson, 435 F.2d at 405.
101. 772 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1985).
102. Id. at 485.
103. Id. at 492.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 494.
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2. Police Instructions/Statements
In addition to prohibiting the joint viewing of photographic ar-
rays, courts have disallowed procedures where police inform a
witness that the photo spread will include a picture of a suspect
already arrested for the crime.1°6 This ruling conforms to the
results of social-science research, which demonstrates that
there is a much greater likelihood of misidentification when
witnesses are lead to believe that the suspect is present in the
array. 07 Witnesses tend to select the person who most closely
resembles the person they observed, rather than selecting no
one from the array at all. 08 For this reason, courts have gener-
ally held that this type of police statement will taint the identi-
fication procedure. 0 9
Studies have found that any kind of instructions that pres-
sure a witness to make an identification from a line-up in-
creases the number of false identifications. 0 Courts have
agreed and, thus, have disapproved of procedures where state
agents provided information or made statements that caused
the witness to focus on a particular suspect. For example, in
United States v. Russell,"' the witness was shown a photo
spread, and she narrowed the identification down to two photo-
graphs, from which she chose one." 2 The FBI agent told her, in
effect, that she had chosen incorrectly and that the other photo-
graph, depicting the defendant, portrayed the person who the
FBI believed committed the robbery. 13 The Sixth Circuit held
that it was "clear that this information was sufficient to create a
very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification." 1 4
However, courts have allowed certain police statements
made to a witness during a photographic line-up, finding that
106. See, e.g., United States v. Lewin, 900 F.2d 145, 148 (8th Cir. 1990). But
see Cikora v. Wainwright, 661 F. Supp. 813, 816 (S.D. Fla. 1987), affd, 840 F.2d
893 (11th Cir. 1988).
107. Lorus, supra note 7, at 144; Cutler et al., supra note 7, at 244 (conclud-
ing that biased instructions reduced the accuracy of identifications and signifi-
cantly increased the number of false identifications).
108. Lo -rs, supra note 7, at 144.
109. See, e.g., Lewin, 900 F.2d at 148.
110. Buckhout et al., supra note 25, at 192.
111. 532 F.2d 1063 (6th Cir. 1976).
112. Id. at 1068.
113. Id.
114. Id.
832 [Vol. 13:815
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol13/iss3/1
DUE PROCESS CHALLENGES
the procedure was not suggestive. In United States v. Olson,115
when a store clerk was unable to identify the person who gave
him a counterfeit bill in a photo spread, an FBI agent took the
defendant's photograph from the spread and asked, "What
about this photograph?" 1 6 The clerk acknowledged that the
moustache was correct but that the individual did not have
enough hair. The agent reassembled the photographic array,
including a picture of the defendant with a toupee. The witness
then identified the defendant Olson as the person who gave her
the counterfeit bill." 7 Olson claimed that the agent improperly
directed the witness's attention to Olson's photograph during
the first array, thereby tainting the subsequent photographic
identification and in-court identification."18 The court held that
the agent's question, 'What about this photograph," was a "neu-
tral inquiry designed to obtain the witness' point of view rather
than to intimate to the witness that the photograph was indeed
that of the suspect."119
Courts have allowed police officers to give witnesses infor-
mation about the height, weight and age of persons pictured, 20
to give information about the description of the suspect, 12' and
to question witnesses as to how they felt about the selections
they made. 22 Most of these types of comments and inquiries
made by police officers are considered to be neutral and not
designed to focus the witness on any one particular suspect. 23
When the "neutral question" or "help" from law enforce-
ment becomes a threat, however, the identification procedure
will most likely taint any subsequent identification. In Mata v.
Sumner, 24 for example, prison authorities threatened inmate-
witnesses with "getting shipped" if they did not "cooperate" dur-
ing a photographic line-up. 25 The Ninth Circuit held that these
115. 730 F.2d 544 (8th Cir. 1984).
116. Id. at 545.
117. Id. at 546.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Judd v. Vose, 813 F.2d 494, 496 (1st Cir. 1987).
121. United States v. Turner, 892 F.2d 11, 14 (1st Cir. 1989).
122. United States v. Givens, 767 F.2d 574, 580 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 953 (1985).
123. Turner, 892 F.2d at 14; Judd, 813 F.2d at 498; Givens, 767 F.2d at 581.
124. 696 F.2d 1244 (9th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 464 U.S. 957 (1983).
125. Id. at 1255.
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threats, surrounding the pretrial identification of a fellow in-
mate, caused the procedure to be impermissibly suggestive. 126
C. Content of Photographs
Putting aside issues surrounding the size and manner of
displaying the photo spread, a photographic line-up may also be
challenged on the basis of the content of the photographs dis-
played.127 If the photographs depict persons so dissimilar from
the defendant that they suggest the identification of the -defend-
ant, the procedure may be subject to challenge.12 Other chal-
lenges have been made where the police altered one or all of the
photographs 129 or required the defendant to dress in a particu-
lar way for the photograph. 130 Other defendants have chal-
lenged the inclusion of captions, names, and/or height charts in
the photograph, 131 or the use of different types or qualities of
photographs in the photospread.132
126. Id.
127. United States v. Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d 934, 974 (2d Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2858 (1991).
128. See, e.g., United States v. Carbajal, 956 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Maldonado-Ri-
vera, 922 F.2d 934 (2d Cir. 1990); Marsden v. Moore, 847 F.2d 1536 (11th Cir.),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 983 (1988); United States v. Ricks, 817 F.2d 692 (11th Cir.
1987).
129. See United States v. Dunbar, 767 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v.
Olson, 730 F.2d 544 (8th Cir. 1984); Griffin v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 606 F.
Supp. 941 (E.D. Va. 1985).
130. United States v. Alexander, 868 F.2d 492 (1st Cir.) (only individual in
photographic array with an earring and hat), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 979 (1989);
Baca v. Sullivan, 821 F.2d 1480 (10th Cir. 1987) (defendant was only one depicted
wearing a leather jacket that was linked to the crime).
131. See, e.g., Cikora v. Dugger, 840 F.2d 893 (11th Cir. 1988) (height mark-
ings appeared only in defendant's photograph); Jarrett v. Headley, 802 F.2d 34 (2d
Cir. 1986) (words "Sheriffs Department" appeared at the bottom of only the de-
fendant's photograph); United States v. Archibald, 734 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1984) (leg-
end on photograph indicated that suspect had been arrested in Manhattan);
United States v. Tyler, 714 F.2d 664, 667 (6th Cir. 1983) (mug board and height
chart appeared only in defendant's photograph); United States v. Lee, 700 F.2d
424 (10th Cir.) (seven photographic arrays where only the photographs of the code-
fendants were in front of a measuring scale for height), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1122
(1983).
132. See, e.g., Perry v. Lockhart, 871 F.2d 1384 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 959 (1989); O'Brien v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1139 (11th Cir. 1984).
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1. Different Appearance
Once the police have obtained a description of a suspect, courts
and social-science researchers agree that the police should at-
tempt to compile a photographic line-up including photographs
depicting persons matching that general description.133 For ex-
ample, if the police have information that the offender is a
white male with fair complexion and red bushy hair, a photo-
graphic line-up depicting five dark complected males with black
hair and only one photograph conforming to the general de-
scription is obviously suggestive. Thus, defendants have chal-
lenged pretrial identification procedures when the defendant's
photograph could be singled out because of a physical feature
not shared by the other persons in the array, 34 or because of a
particular style of dress not shared by others depicted in the
photo spread. 3 5 To avoid differences in photographs dramatic
enough to make a procedure suggestive, courts have required
that the photographs used must be reasonably similar in ap-
pearance.13 6 The test is to determine whether there is a differ-
133. Courts generally prefer that the photographic array depicts persons of
similar race and features. See Salam v. Lockhart, 874 F.2d 525 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 898 (1989). But see Cikora v. Dugger, 840 F.2d 893 (11th Cir.
1988); United States v. Monks, 774 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1985).
Social-science research demonstrates that high similarity line-ups increase
identification accuracy. See CLIFFORD & BULL supra note 27, at 111; Doob & Kir-
shenbaum, supra note 5, at 289; Lindsay & Wells, supra note 5, at 55 (high simi-
larity line-ups reduce the rate of false identification of innocent suspects); see also
Levine & Tapp, supra note 5, at 1120.
In constructing a line-up, Luus and Wells argue that the focus should be on
similarity to the initial description given by the eyewitness rather than similarity
to the suspect. Elizabeth Luus & Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Identification and the
Selection of Distractors for Lineups, 15 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 43, 55 (1991).
134. See Marsden v. Moore, 847 F.2d 1536, 1545 (11th Cir.) (only male de-
picted in the array), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 983 (1988); United States v. Whitney,
787 F.2d 457, 459 (8th Cir. 1986) (only light complexioned black male in the array);
United States v. Bice-Bey, 701 F.2d 1086, 1089 (4th Cir.) (only female with
dredlocks), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 837 (1983).
135. See, e.g., Gibson v. Blackburn, 744 F.2d 403, 404 (5th Cir. 1984); United
States v. Baykowski, 583 F.2d 1046, 1047 (8th Cir. 1978).
136. United States v. Lewis, 547 F.2d 1030, 1034-35 (8th Cir. 1976) (stating
that, [Plolice stations are not theatrical casting offices; a reasonable effort to har-
monize the line-up is normally all that is required."), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1111
(1977).
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ence between the photographs that tend to isolate or emphasize
a particular suspect's photograph. 137
In applying this standard, the Fourth Circuit in United
States v. Bice-Bey 38 found that it was suggestive to place only
one photograph in the array which portrayed a woman with
dredlocks and a head covering. 39 The single photograph was so
unusual that it tended to isolate and emphasize the photograph,
making the array unreasonable. 40 Similarly, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit has held, in Marsden v. Moore,'4' that the photographic
identification procedure was unreasonably suggestive when the
defendant was the only male in the photographs shown to the
victim. 42
In United States v. Ricks, 43 after a bank robbery, police put
together a photo spread which included six males of the same
race, but only one, defendant Ricks, had glasses. 1' Since the
perpetrator had worn sunglasses during the robbery, but not
eyeglasses, the Eleventh Circuit admitted the identification of
Ricks. The court implied, however, that the photo spread bor-
dered on being suggestive since Ricks's photograph stood out.
"Although we do not find the photospread in this case to be too
suggestive, . . . that is not to say that we approve of this prac-
tice. Prosecutors and law enforcement agents must guard
against this type of photo spread." 45
In other photo spreads, the courts have held that the differ-
ences between photographs were not so dramatic as to be un-
reasonable. In United States v. Thurston, 46 the defendant
claimed that the pretrial photographic display was impermissi-
137. United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 803 (2d Cir. 1992) ("[Tlhe test
is, whether the picture of the accused, matching descriptions given by the witness,
so stood out from all the other photographs as to suggest to an identifying witness
that [that person] was more likely to be the culprit."). But see Jarrett v. Headley,
802 F.2d 34, 41 (2d Cir. 1986) ("It is not required... that all of the photographs in
the array be uniform with respect to a given characteristic.").
138. 701 F.2d 1086 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 837 (1983).
139. Id. at 1089.
140. Id. at 1090. Though the court held that the procedure was suggestive,
the court admitted the identification on the basis of its reliability. Id.
141. 847 F.2d 1536 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 983 (1988).
142. Id. at 1545.
143. 817 F.2d 692 (11th Cir. 1987).
144. Id. at 697.
145. Id.
146. 771 F.2d 449 (10th Cir. 1983).
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bly suggestive because his photograph was the only one of six
blacks who appeared with a beard and whose hair was
braided.147 The Tenth Circuit reviewed the display and found
that it was not so unreasonable as to make it suggestive:
We find that Thurston's general complexion and facial profile
fairly resembles those of the other subjects in the photospread, all
of whom were blacks. We cannot say that it was unduly sugges-
tive because his picture was the only one among the display ex-
hibits which had a beard... [and]... the only one whose hair...
was braided.148
In United States v. Carbajal,149 the defendant claimed that
the photo spread was suggestive because he was the only person
in the photo spread with discernible bruises on his face. 150 The
Ninth Circuit pointed out that the six photographs in the array
were all of Hispanic males in the same age range with similar
skin, eye and hair coloring. The fact that the defendant was the
only one with bruises on his face did not make the photograph
stand out to such an extent that it was unduly suggestive. 15'
The Second Circuit, in United States v. Jakobetz,152 likewise
held that the different type of facial hair on those depicted in
the photo spread did not isolate or emphasize the defendant's
photograph to an impermissible level.153 In Jakobetz, a witness
described the perpetrator as having no facial hair. She was
shown a photo spread of six males of the same race, height, and
coloring. All had moustaches, except that the moustache of the
defendant was thinner, lighter and less prominent. The court
noted the district court's statement:
[T]o be sure, defendant's moustache does appear to be smaller
than the others. This fact alone, however, does not rise to the
level of impermissible suggestiveness. The court does not believe
that the victim's description of a man with no facial hair causes
defendant's photograph with a thinner moustache to stand out
from all the others. 54
147. Id. at 452.
148. Id. at 453.
149. 956 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1992).
150. Id. at 929.
151. Id.
152. 955 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1992).
153. Id. at 803.
154. Id.
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In addition to claims based on differences in physical char-
acteristics, defendants have also challenged arrays that de-
picted the defendant in particular clothing that would suggest
he was the perpetrator. In Gibson v. Blackburn,155 the defend-
ant claimed that he was photographed in a black jacket similar
to one worn by the robbery suspect and that none of the others
in the array were so dressed, causing the witness to single out
his photograph. 156 The Fifth Circuit held that the clothing worn
by the defendant in the photograph did not contribute to the
pretrial identification of him as the offender. The coat was
barely visible in the photograph and appeared to be cloth, as
opposed to leather which was worn by the suspect.157
On the other hand, the Eighth Circuit in United States v.
Baykowski, 158 held that a photo spread in which the defendant
was the only one wearing a sweater was impermissibly sugges-
tive. 59 The victim of a burglary reported certain items stolen
from her home, including a particular sweater. Two months af-
ter the burglary, she went to identify some property and was
also shown a photospread in which one of the suspects wore a
sweater. While the victim could not identify the person, she
recognized the sweater as being similar to the one taken in the
burglary. 160
The court held that a subsequent in-court identification of
the defendant should have been excluded. 61 Since the photo-
graph of Baykowski was the only one that depicted an individ-
ual wearing a sweater, the court found that the photographic
display tended to isolate and emphasize her photograph and
was, therefore, unnecessarily suggestive. 162 Similarly in Baca
v. Sullivan, 63 the Tenth Circuit held that a photographic array
was unduly suggestive where the defendant was the only one
155. 744 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1984).
156. Id. at 404.
157. Id. at 405.
158. 583 F.2d 1046 (8th Cir. 1978).
159. Id. at 1047.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1048.
162. Id.
163. 821 F.2d 1480 (10th Cir. 1987).
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depicted in a brown-leather jacket similar to the one worn by
the gunman who shot the witness's husband.64
Thus, when testing a claim that a pretrial procedure was
suggestive because of defendant's unusual characteristics or
clothing, the courts will generally review the photo spread to
determine whether there was a "reasonable effort to harmonize
the line-up."165 If the array is such that some unusual charac-
teristic draws attention to the defendant and causes the defend-
ant's photograph to be singled out, then the pretrial procedure
will be held to be impermissibly suggestive.
2. Difference in Type or Quality of Photographs
Courts and researchers generally agree that photographs
included in an array should be of similar type and quality. 66
Any difference which tends to draw attention to a particular
suspect's photograph may be suggestive. However, minor dis-
tinctions in type or quality of the photograph will not be held to
be unnecessarily suggestive. 67
Photo spreads which mix color and black-and-white photo-
graphs have been found to be unnecessarily suggestive because
of the dramatic difference between color and black-and-white
164. Id. at 1482. Even though the court found the photo spread unduly sug-
gestive, because the witness had positively identified the defendant in a previous
photo spread that was not suggestive, the court found that the degree of sugges-
tiveness was outweighed by sufficient evidence of reliability. Id.
165. United States v. Lewis, 547 F.2d 1030, 1035 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1111 (1977).
166. Courts recognize that if photographs tend to emphasize one suspect's pic-
ture, the procedure may violate the suspect's due process rights. See, e.g., Sim-
mons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 383 (1968); see also Styers v. Smith, 659 F.2d
293, 297 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that a small group of photographs, only two of
which were fresh and in color depicting the codefendants in a robbery case was
impermissibly suggestive); Passman v. Blackburn, 652 F.2d 559, 570 (5th Cir.
1981) (holding a color photograph of the defendant displayed with eleven other
black-and-white mug shots carried inherent suggestiveness), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
1022 (1982).
Social-science researchers have demonstrated empirically that witnesses are
more likely to select a photograph that is distinctive, even slightly, from others
(i.e., if a picture were taken at a different angle from others). See Levine & Tapp,
supra note 5, at 1120.
167. See, e.g., United States v. Russo, 796 F.2d 1443 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding
that the yellow tint of defendant's photograph did not make it stand out from
others and was therefore not suggestive).
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photographs. 168 For example, in O'Brien v. Wainwright,169 the
police compiled a photographic line-up consisting of black-and-
white mug shots except for the picture of defendant O'Brien,
which was a color polaroid print. 70 The witness identified
O'Brien from the display. 171 Two weeks later, the witness again
identified the color print of O'Brien in a slightly different photo
spread. 172 In the new array, additional black-and-white mug
shots had been added, including shots of O'Brien. 173 The wit-
ness examined the photographic display two more times and
identified the color print of O'Brien without noticing the black-
and-white mug shots of him. 174 The Eleventh Circuit concluded
that O'Brien's picture "stuck out like a sore thumb," making the
photographic display unduly suggestive. 175
Arrays in which the defendant's photograph is of a different
type than the others shown have been held to be suggestive.
For example, a photo spread in which the defendant's photo-
graph is a family snapshot, while all other photographs are mug
shots may draw attention to the defendant. 176 However, at least
one court has held that the use of a family-type photograph of
the defendant displayed with mug shots actually reduced the
likelihood that he would be identified because there was noth-
168. See, e.g., Styers v. Smith, 659 F.2d 293, 297 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding a
small group of photographs, only two of which were fresh and in color, depicted
codefendants in a robbery case, were suggestive); Passman v. Blackburn, 652 F.2d
559, 570 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding where a color photograph of defendant was dis-
played with eleven black-and-white mug shots), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982).
169. 738 F.2d 1139 (lth Cir. 1984).
170. Id. at 1140.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1141.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See Perry v. Lockhart, 871 F.2d 1384, 1391 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 959 (1989) (holding suggestive a photographic line-up that showed defendant
in snapshot-type photograph sitting up in a hospital bed while other photographs
in the array were standard mug shots); United States v. Alexander, 816 F.2d 164
(5th Cir. 1987) (holding a photo spread suggestive but identification was admitted
on the basis of reliability where defendant's driver's license picture was displayed
with six black-and-white mug shot photographs), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1069
(1990).
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ing to suggest that the defendant had ever been arrested for a
crime.177
3. Superfluous Content of Photographs
Not only does a lack of uniformity of appearance provide a
basis for a constitutional challenge to a photographic array, but
many defendants have also challenged arrays because their
particular photograph contained a caption 78 or a measurement
chart 179 when other photographs did not. Empirical findings
suggest that any distinctive quality of one photograph might
lead to an increased probability of its selection and, therefore,
enhance the rate of false identification. °80 However, courts have
generally held that these inclusions of distinctive photographs
do not, standing alone, make an array unreasonably
suggestive.' 8 '
Courts have held that photographs containing captions or
names do not render photographic arrays impermissibly sug-
gestive. In United States v. Archibald,8 2 the photographic ar-
ray contained photographs of six black men who bore certain
resemblances to one another. 8 3 The defendant's mug shot,
however, was the only one that indicated that he was arrested
in the Borough of Manhattan, the location of the robbery. 84 All
of the mug shots contained an identification plate showing the
177. United States ex rel. Kubat v. Thieret, 679 F. Supp. 788 (N.D. Ill. 1988),
affd, 867 F.2d 351 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 874 (1989).
178. See, e.g., United States v. Archibald, 734 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1984) (legend
on photograph indicating suspect had been arrested in Manhattan); Jarrett v.
Headley, 802 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1986) (word "Sheriff' appeared at bottom of defend-
ant's photograph only).
179. Cikora v. Dugger, 840 F.2d 893, 894 (11th Cir. 1988) (defendant's photo-
graph was the only one amongst other mug shots that had height markings);
United States v. DeBardeleben, 740 F.2d 440, 445 (6th Cir.) (defendant's photo-
graph was the only photograph in the array containing a height chart and depict-
ing the defendant's shoulder area), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1028 (1984); United
States v. Tyler, 714 F.2d 664, 667 (6th Cir. 1983) (defendant's photograph was
different from others in array in that it showed a mug board and height chart);
United States v. Lee, 700 F.2d 424, 426 (10th Cir.) (seven photographic arrays
where only the photographs of the codefendants were in front of a measuring scale
for height), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1122 (1983).
180. Buckhout, supra note 5, at 71.
181. See cases cited supra note 178.
182. 734 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1984).
183. Id. at 940.
184. Id.
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date and borough of the arrest, but the Second Circuit found
that the captions were not unduly prominent and that, in this
case, the array was "a remarkably fair group of photographs."18 5
Although it concluded that the array was not impermissibly
suggestive, the court found that leaving these captions on the
photographs was unnecessary. 8 6 As the court noted, "It would
have been a simple matter to cut out the identifying captions
...."187 The court concluded that the use of captioned photo-
graphs did not amount to constitutional error, but was "poor
prosecutorial practice." 88 Height charts and pose differences in
photographs have also been deemed insufficient to render a
photographic array impermissibly suggestive.'8 9
In United States v. Hanigan,90 the Ninth Circuit held that
the identification, which consisted of picking the defendants'
photographs out of a high school yearbook, was not impermissi-
bly suggestive. 19' In Hanigan, two brothers, Thomas and Pat-
rick Hanigan, brutally tortured and robbed three
undocumented Mexican citizens on the Hanigans' ranch in
southern Arizona. 192 The victims, who were illiterate, were
later shown a copy of a high school yearbook and asked if they
could identify anyone. 93 Both victims picked out pictures of the
two Hanigan brothers. 94
Patrick Hanigan contended that the procedure was sugges-
tive because his name appeared under his picture and the vic-
tims might have learned the name "Hanigan" from the sign
located in front of the ranch.195 While implying that, in some
circumstances, this pretrial procedure would be suggestive, the
court found that it was unlikely that the pretrial identification
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See cases cited supra note 179.
190. 681 F.2d 1127 (9th Cir. 1982).
191. Id. at 1133.
192. Id. at 1129.
193. Id. at 1132-33.
194. Id.
195. Id.
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was suggestive in this case given the fact that the victims were
unable to read.196
4. Disguise and Alteration of the Photographs
Courts have held that requiring all participants in a photo-
graphic line-up, including the defendant, to have their photo-
graphs taken in disguise was not impermissibly suggestive. 197
Courts have also allowed the practice of retouching all photo-
graphs in an array. 98 However, if the police retouch only one
photograph or force only one participant to wear a disguise,
thereby focusing the witness's attention on the single photo-
graph, the procedure would probably violate due process. 99
Thus, as demonstrated above, any procedure that unrea-
sonably draws attention to the defendant's photograph in an ar-
ray can be challenged as suggestive.200 If the court finds that
the procedure was not suggestive, the pretrial identification, as
well as the in-court identification, is admissible. If the pretrial
identification procedure is impermissibly suggestive, then the
court must make further inquiry into the reliability of the
procedure. 20'
V. Reliability
The second prong of the Biggers/Manson test is whether,
regardless of the pretrial procedure, the identification is clothed
with indicia of reliability. 20 2 The goal of the due process protec-
196. Id. at 1133. The court also held that the identifications were reliable and
therefore should be admitted even if the pretrial procedure had been suggestive.
Id.
197. See, e.g., Griffin v. Virginia, 606 F. Supp. 941, 946 (E.D. Va. 1985) (where
all participants were required to wear a false beard, a cap, and sunglasses when
posing for a photograph to be used in an array).
198. See, e.g., United States v. Dunbar, 767 F.2d 72, 73 (3d Cir. 1985) (where
police retouched all six photographs in an array to show the suspect with a beard
and cap exactly like the one depicted in the surveillance photograph).
199. Id.
200. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 383-84 (1968).
201. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977); see also Robinson v.
Clarke, 939 F.2d 573, 575-76 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Stevens, 935 F.2d
1380 (3d Cir. 1991); Herrera v. Collins, 904 F.2d 944, 948-49 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 498 U.S. 925 (1990).
202. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114 ("We therefore conclude that reliability is
the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony . . ").
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tion is to "avoid having suggestive methods transform a selec-
tion that was only tentative into one that is positively
certain."20 3 However, if the identification is reliable even
though the pretrial procedures were suggestive, the identifica-
tion is admissible unless the procedures would lead to a sub-
stantial likelihood of misidentification. 20 4 Five factors to be
considered when determining reliability were set out in Neil v.
Biggers20 5 and reaffirmed in Manson v. Brathwaite:20 6
These include the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal
at the time of the crime, the witness' degree of attention, the accu-
racy of his prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty
demonstrated at the confrontation, and the time between the
crime and the confrontation. 20 7
In general, courts find that: the longer the witness's oppor-
tunity to view the offender; the greater the attention to the of-
fender at the time of the offense; the more detailed the initial
description from the witness; the greater the certainty demon-
strated by the witness; and the shorter the length of time be-
tween the crime and the viewing of the photographic array; the
more reliable the identification.208
While social-science researchers would agree that some of
these factors enhance the accuracy of the identifications, stud-
ies have shown that others do not. Researchers have generally
found that longer exposure to the offender enhances the relia-
bility of a subsequent identification.20 9 Likewise, a greater
amount of attention to the offender 210 and a shorter time inter-
203. Solomon v. Smith, 645 F.2d 1179, 1185 (2d Cir. 1981).
204. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114.
205. 409 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972).
206. 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
207. Id. at 114.
208. See Reese v. Fulcomer, 946 F.2d 247, 258 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 1679 (1992); United States v. Burke, 738 F.2d 1225, 1229 (11th Cir. 1984);
Hakeem v. Beyer, 774 F. Supp. 276, 286 (D.N.J. 1991).
209. The amount of time that the perpetrator is exposed has been found to
influence the accuracy of the identification. Correct recognition is facilitated by
increasing exposure time. See Kenneth R. Laughery et al., Recognition of Human
Faces: Effects of Target Exposure Time, Target Position, Pose Position, & Type of
Photograph, 55 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 477, 477 (1971); Peter Shapiro & Steven Pen-
rod, A Meta-Analysis of the Facial Identification Literature, 100 PSYCHOL. BULL.
139, 148 (1986).
210. LoFrus, supra note 7, at 31-36; Cutler et al., supra note 7, at 240, 244.
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val between the crime and the identification 21' have both been
shown to enhance the accuracy of an identification. But re-
searchers have cast doubt on whether the level of certainty and
detail of the description actually enhance the accuracy of the
identification.212
Many studies demonstrate that there is no correlation be-
tween the confidence of the witness and the accuracy of the
identification. 21 3 Additionally, studies have shown that the cor-
relation between prior descriptions and identification accuracy
is, at best, very weak or nonexistent. 214 Yet, studies have indi-
cated that juries are highly influenced by a confident witness
and have placed importance on the witness's ability to make
prior descriptions and accurate identifications. 215 These dis-
crepancies between lay intuition and research findings raise
questions as to whether the Biggers factors should continue to
be used as predictors of identification accuracy and reliability.
In addition to these discrepancies, other factors not recog-
nized by the courts may be present, and these factors may de-
crease the likelihood of a reliable identification. Experts in
eyewitness identification have established that the memory
211. LoFrus, supra note 7, at 52-53, 68-70; Cutler et al., supra note 11, at 131-
32; Krouse, supra note 11, at 651.
212. See sources cited infra notes 213-14.
213. See, e.g., Brian R. Clifford & Jane Scott, Individual and Situational Fac-
tors in Eyewitness Testimony, 63 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 352, 358 (1978); Kenneth
Deffenbacher, Eyewitness Accuracy and Confidence: Can We Infer Anything about
their Relationship?, 4 L. & HuM. BEHAV. 243, 258 (1980). After reviewing 43 stud-
ies on the accuracy/confidence relationship, Deffenbacher concluded that the judi-
cial system should stop relying on witness confidence as a predictor of
identification accuracy. Id.
214. Melissa Pigott & John C. Brigham, The Relationship Between the Accu-
racy of Prior Description and Facial Recognition, 70 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 547
(1985); Alvin G. Goldstein et al., Does Fluency of Face Description Imply Superior
Face Recognition? 13 BULL. PSYCHONOMIC Soc'Y 15 (1979).
Studies have also shown that memory for peripheral details surrounding an
event is negatively correlated with identification accuracy. Cutler et al., supra
note 7, at 253-54. However, the more detailed the witness's description of an
event, the more credibility jurors give the identification. Gary L. Wells & Michael
R. Lieppe, How Do Triers of Fact Infer the Accuracy of Eyewitness Identification?
Using Memory for Peripheral Detail Can be Misleading, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL.
682, 685 (1981).
215. Empirical studies have shown that a juror's perception of witness confi-
dence accounts for 50% of the variance in juror judgment as to the accuracy of a
witness's identification. Wells et al., supra note 15, at 440.
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does not work like a videocassette recorder.216 Memory does not
perfectly record an event or permanently store it to be "played
back" at a later time.217 Experts break down the memory pro-
cess into three major stages: acquisition (when an event is per-
ceived by a witness and information is entered into the memory
system), retention (the time between the witnessing of the
event and the attempt to recall it), and retrieval (the attempt to
recall the event).218
Many factors exist at each stage which affect the reliability
of a witnesses' memory. In the acquisition stage, factors are
broken down into "event factors" (lighting conditions, duration
of event, and violence) and "witness factors" (stress/fear, age,
sex, and expectations). 219 Factors during the retention stage in-
clude length of retention interval and acquisition of post-event
information. 220 At the retrieval stage, researchers have identi-
fied two crucial factors: method of questioning and confidence
level.22' Additionally, particular problems have been identified
with respect to the difficulty of accurately recognizing a person
of a different race. 222 Studies have shown an increased rate of
error when an individual attempts to identify a member of a
different race. 223 Although it has been demonstrated by empiri-
cal studies that the many factors discussed above affect the reli-
ability of an identification, only a few of them are utilized by the
courts when they apply the required totality of circumstances
approach set out in Biggers.
With respect to the acquisition stage, courts do analyze
many of the "event factors" recognized in social-science re-
search. Courts take several issues into account when determin-
ing if a witness had an adequate opportunity to view the
216. LoFrus, supra note 7, at 20-21.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 21.
219. Id. at 23, 32.
220. Id. at 54, 64.
221. LoFrus & DOYLE, supra note 15, at 31-32.
222. Roy S. Malpass & Jerome Kravits, Recognition for Faces of Own and
Other Race, 13 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 330, 330 (1969); see also John C.
Brigham & Paul Barkowitz, Do they All Look Alike? The Effect of Race, Sex, Experi-
ence & Attitudes on the Ability to Recognize Faces, 62 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 306, 307
(1978); Terence Luce, Blacks, Whites and Yellows: They All Look Alike to Me, 8
PSYCHOL. TODAY 105, 106 (1974).
223. See, e.g., Luce, supra note 222, at 105-06.
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perpetrator: length of time in viewing, distance between wit-
ness and perpetrator, and lighting.224 Overlapping with the op-
portunity to view is the witness's degree of attention. This
refers to whether the witness's attention was focused on the of-
fender, whether the witness was distracted by other people or
events, or whether the witness was just a casual observer. 225
With respect to the accuracy of the description of the perpe-
trator, courts look to the detail of the description as an impor-
tant factor in the reliability.226 A description giving the height,
weight, age, build, race, complexion, hair color, and clothing of a
perpetrator will be given more weight than a general descrip-
tion lacking in similar detail.227
With respect to the retention stage, courts generally find
that the longer the time between the crime and the photo-
graphic identification, the more suspect the reliability of the
identification. 228 However, the longer the witness has had an
opportunity to view the perpetrator during the commission of
the crime, the longer the time frame the courts will allow be-
tween the crime and the photographic identification. 229 With
respect to the final, retrieval stage, courts look at the certainty
of the identification, but do not extensively analyze what post-
event information might affect the reliability of the
identification. 230
224. See United States v. Donahue, 948 F.2d 438 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 1600 (1992); Herrera v. Collins, 904 F.2d 944 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. de-
nied, 111 S. Ct. 307 (1991); United States v. Gregory, 891 F.2d 732 (9th Cir. 1989);
United States ex rel. Kosik v. Napoli, 814 F.2d 1151, 1157 (7th Cir. 1987); United
States v. Serna, 799 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1013 (1987);
United States v. Goodman, 797 F.2d 468 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Damsky,
740 F.2d 134 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 918 (1984); Robinson v. Wyrick, 735
F.2d 1091 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 983 (1984); United States v. Woolery,
735 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985).
225. See Marsden v. Moore, 847 F.2d 1536 (11th Cir. 1988); Velez v. Schmer,
724 F.2d 249 (1st Cir. 1984); Mata v. Sumner, 696 F.2d 1244 (9th Cir.), vacated on
other grounds, 464 U.S. 957 (1983).
226. See, e.g., Velez v. Schmer, 724 F.2d 249 (1st Cir. 1984).
227. Id. at 252.
228. See, e.g., Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 115-16 (1977); Neil v. Big-
gers, 409 U.S. 188, 201 (1972).
229. See, e.g., United States v. Rundell, 858 F.2d 425 (8th Cir. 1988); United
States v. Serna, 799 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1013 (1987).
230. United States v. Rundell, 858 F.2d 425, 426 (8th Cir. 1988).
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The above "rules" indicate that there is a fairly systematic
way that courts go about analyzing reliability. However, the ac-
tual application of these "rules" result in decisions in which
identifications are found to be accurate and, therefore, reliable
under widely varying circumstances.
A. Adequate Opportunity to View
At one end of the spectrum, one court found that a witness
had an adequate opportunity to view the defendant when the
witness saw the defendant ten to fifteen times over the course of
one year, at close range, in good lighting, for several minutes on
each occasion.231 At the other end of the spectrum, however,
another court found that a witness who saw a drive-by shooting
at night had an adequate opportunity to view, even though the
incident was over in a few seconds, the only lighting was from a
street lamp, and the witness was the width of the road away
from the occupant of the car when he fired the shots.23 2 In other
cases, observations of the defendant from fourteen seconds to
thirty minutes have been held to support a reliable identifica-
tion when the observations were at relatively close range with
fairly good lighting.233
231. United States v. Damsky, 740 F.2d 134, 140 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 918 (1984).
232. United States ex rel. Kosik v. Napoli, 814 F.2d 1151, 1157 (7th Cir. 1987).
Four witnesses gave differing testimony about the length of time over which the
incident took place. Estimates ranged from a few seconds to two minutes and one
witness said it took six to eight minutes. However, all witnesses testified that the
car drove by and did not stop or slow down markedly so the lower court concluded
that the incident "occurred quickly." Id. at 1154 n.4.
233. See United States v. Donahue, 948 F.2d 438 (8th Cir. 1991) (witness saw
defendant's face for about one minute during a robbery at a distance of two to three
feet), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1600 (1992); Herrera v. Collins, 904 F.2d 944 (5th
Cir.) (witness saw gunman in headlights for about 14 seconds at 15 feet), cert. de-
nied, 498 U.S. 925 (1990); United States v. Gregory, 891 F.2d 732 (9th Cir. 1989)
(witness saw robber at close range for 30 seconds); United States v. Goodman, 797
F.2d 468 (7th Cir. 1986) (witness saw defendant for 15 to 20 seconds under good
lighting at close range); United States v. Serna, 799 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1986) (wit-
ness had been within two to three feet of defendant for 30 minutes), cert. denied,
481 U.S. 1013 (1987); Robinson v. Wyrick, 735 F.2d 1091 (8th Cir.) (witness ob-
served defendant in good light for about 30 seconds at a distance of 25 feet), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 983 (1984); United States v. Woolery, 735 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1984)
(witness saw defendant face-to-face for two to three minutes in broad daylight),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985).
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B. Degree of Attention and Accuracy of Description
It is rare for a court to find that a witness did not have an
adequate opportunity to view. Courts have found inadequate
viewing only where it was evident that the witness could not
actually have seen the perpetrator or where the witness's atten-
tion was so focused on a distracting object that his or her oppor-
tunity to observe the perpetrator was severely limited. In Mata
v. Sumner,234 the Ninth Circuit found the identification unrelia-
ble because one witness did not have his glasses on at the time
of the offense and the other admitted that the attack happened
so fast, he did not get a good look at the attacker.235
In Velez v. Schmer,236 the First Circuit found that two teen-
age witnesses who had suddenly been confronted by a man with
a rifle were so focused on the man's vehicle that their identifica-
tion of the assailant was suspect.237 Their detailed description
of the car and their very vague description of the assailant indi-
cated that the witnesses' attention was not directed at the
assailant. 238
In Marsden v. Moore,239 the Eleventh Circuit likewise found
that the witness could not have focused her attention on the
suspect sufficiently to make her identification reliable. 240 The
suspect had briefly shared a hospital room with the witness's
husband two years prior to the identification, and there was no
reason for the witness to pay any special attention to the sus-
pect at that time.241
The importance of the degree of attention to identification
accuracy is supported by social-science research, especially
where a weapon is used in the crime. If there is a weapon pres-
ent during the commission of a crime, the reliability and accu-
racy of an identification decreases because the witness's
attention will be focused on the weapon rather than on encoding
234. 696 F.2d 1244 (9th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 464 U.S. 957 (1983).
235. Id. at 1247.
236. 724 F.2d 249 (1st Cir. 1984).
237. Id. at 250.
238. Id. at 253.
239. 847 F.2d 1536 (11th Cir. 1988).
240. Id. at 1546.
241. Id.
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the perpetrator's facial features.242 Though some courts have
acknowledged this theory, most courts have found that a
weapon alone is not so distracting as to nullify the accuracy of a
witness's identification. 43
One last factor that courts review with respect to the de-
gree of attention is whether the witness has had special train-
ing in observational skills. For example, police officers have
this type of training. 244 It is commonly believed that a police
officer pays a higher degree of attention to details than a lay
witness does because of the special training the police receive in
observational techniques. 245
However, social-science research indicates that police of-
ficers are actually no more accurate than other witnesses. 246
One study demonstrated that a police officer actually performs
more poorly than a civilian, due to the police officer's biased in-
terpretation of events.247 Therefore, the reliance that courts
place on a police officer's special training to enhance identifica-
tion accuracy may be misplaced.
C. Time Interval
With respect to the retention stage, social-science research
demonstrates that the shorter the time interval between the
crime and the identification, the more accurate the identifica-
tion. 248 Courts likewise recognize that a shorter time interval
242. Cutler et al., supra note 7, at 240, 244 (weapon visibility significantly
lowered identification accuracy); Elizabeth F. Loftus et al., Some Facts About
Weapon Focus, 11 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 55, 55 (1987) (experiments showed that the
presence of a weapon significantly lowered identification accuracy of
eyewitnesses).
243. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Kosik v. Napoli, 814 F.2d 1151 (7th Cir.
1987).
244. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 115 (1977); United States v. Dr-
ing, 930 F.2d 687, 693 (9th Cir. 1991); Herrera v. Collins, 904 F.2d 944, 948 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 925 (1990); United States v. Lewin, 900 F.2d 145, 149
(8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Bagley, 772 F.2d 482, 494 (9th Cir. 1985).
245. Dring, 930 F.2d at 693; Herrera, 904 F.2d at 948; Lewin, 900 F.2d at 149.
246. Elizabeth F. Loftus, Eyewitnesses: Essential But Unreliable, 18 PSYCHOL.
TODAY 22, 24 (Feb. 1984).
247. Brian Clifford, Police as Eyewitnesses, 36 NEW Soc'Y 176 (1976).
248. LoFTus, supra note 7, at 52-53, 68-70; Cutler et al., supra note 11, at 131-
32; Krouse, supra note 11, at 651.
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enhances identification reliability. 249 However, there is a dis-
crepancy between legal rulings and social-science research re-
garding how long that interval can be before it negatively
affects the reliability of the identification.
The "forgetting curve" describes the uneven rate at which
information is forgotten, with a severe decline in recall occur-
ring quickly, followed by a slower decline.250 Post-event infor-
mation has been found to distort the memory, permanently
altering it to conform with the post-event information re-
ceived.25 ' One study found that the accuracy of an identification
of students seen several times a week for ten weeks fell to sixty-
nine percent after just two weeks, and to only forty-eight per-
cent after one year.25 2 The ability to accurately identify a stran-
ger with whom a witness had a single encounter lasting a brief
period has been shown to be essentially nonexistent in less than
one year.25 3 Despite this, courts have allowed identifications
that took place as long as four years after the witness had an
opportunity to view the perpetrator.25 4
In Neil v. Biggers,255 the Supreme Court found that a lapse
of seven months between the rape and the identification "would
be a seriously negative factor in most cases."25 6 The Eighth Cir-
cuit, in United States v. Rundell,25 7 likewise found a delay of
eight months to be "the factor most negatively affecting the reli-
ability of the identification."258 The Second Circuit, in United
249. Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 115-16 (1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409
U.S. 188, 201 (1972).
250. See generally Kenneth Deffenbacher, On the Memorability of the Human
Face, reprinted in ASPECTS OF FACE PROCESSING (1985); H. E. EBBINGHOUS, MEM-
oRY: A CONTRIBUTION TO EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY (1964).
251. LoFrus, supra note 7, at 54-55.
252. Harry P. Bahrick, Memory for People, reprinted in EVERYDAY MEMORY,
ACTIONS, AND ABSENTMINDEDNESS, 27 (J.E. Harris & P.E. Morris eds., 1983). In
another study, a researcher tested clerical workers' recognition of pictures after
intervals of two hours, three days, one week, and four months. Retention dropped
from about 100% at the two hour interval to 57% after four months. Roger N.
Shepard, Recognition Memory for Words, Sentences & Pictures, 6 J. VERBAL LEARN-
ING AND VERBAL BEHAV. 156 (1987).
253. Lorrus, supra note 7, at 68-70.
254. See, e.g., United States v. Samalot-Perez, 767 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1985).
255. 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
256. Id. at 201.
257. 858 F.2d 425 (8th Cir. 1988).
258. Id. at 427.
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States v. Maldonado-Rivera,259 termed a time interval of one
year "a lengthy delay."260
In United States v. Marchand,261 the Second Circuit found
that a nine-month delay "did not weigh in favor of admissibil-
ity."262 In each of these cases, however, the court admitted the
identifications despite the time delays, finding that the delay
was outweighed by other indicia of reliability.263 Courts rou-
tinely find that delays of a few hours to several months do not
negatively affect the reliability and accuracy of an
identification. 264
D. Confidence of Witness
While the Biggers Court specifically listed eyewitness confi-
dence as a valid criterion upon which to judge the reliability of
eyewitness testimony,265 the correlation between identification
accuracy and confidence level has been the subject of a massive
debate among social-science researchers. A few studies show
that confidence level is a valid predictor of identification accu-
259. 922 F.2d 934 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2811 (1991).
260. Id. at 976.
261. 564 F.2d 983 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 732 (1978).
262. Id. at 996.
263. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 201 (1972); Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d at
976; United States v. Rundell, 858 F.2d 425, 427 (8th Cir. 1988); Marchand, 564
F.2d at 996.
264. See, e.g., United States v. Donahue, 948 F.2d 438 (8th Cir. 1991) (five-day
delay did not affect reliability), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1600 (1992); United States
v. Dring, 930 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1991) (two-week delay did not taint reliability);
Scroggy v. Kordenbrak, 919 F.2d 1091 (6th Cir. 1990) (less than one-month delay
did not taint reliability), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1608 (1991); Porter v. United
States, 831 F.2d 760 (8th Cir. 1987) (seven weeks not too long a delay), cert. de-
nied, 484 U.S. 1069 (1988); Clark v. Fike, 538 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1976) (five-month
delay upheld), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1064 (1977); Hodge v. Henderson, 761 F.
Supp. 993 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (six-week delay upheld), affd, 929 F.2d 61 (2d Cir.
1991); United States ex rel. McTush v. O'Brien, 644 F.Supp. 322 (N.D. Ill. 1986)
(three-month delay did not taint reliability), affd, 832 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1987).
265. One of the five factors enumerated was "the level of certainty demon-
strated by the witness at the time of the confrontation . . . ." Biggers, 409 U.S. at
199-200.
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racy,26 6 while many others demonstrate that there is no correla-
tion between certainty and reliability of the identification.267
Researcher Kenneth Deffenbacher reviewed twenty-five
studies reporting forty-three separate assessments of the accu-
racy-confidence relationship and concluded that there may be a
confidence-accuracy relationship under certain "optimal" wit-
nessing conditions, but that there is no reasonably precise way
to determine the degree of optimality for any given real-life sit-
uation.268 Given the weight afforded the testimony of a confi-
dent eyewitness by the jury,26 9 Deffenbacher concluded that
"the judicial system should cease and desist from a reliance on
eyewitness confidence as an index of eyewitness accuracy."270
Regardless of the lack of support for the confidence-accu-
racy correlation in the social-science world, courts continue to
rely on confidence as a predictor of reliability. Under the total-
ity of circumstances approach, courts tend to review two issues
regarding certainty: one is the degree of certainty required to
support the admissibility of the identification; and the second is
the point at which the eyewitness becomes certain.271 In Big-
gers, the Court stated that one of the factors to be reviewed was
"the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the con-
frontation."272 But if the initial confrontation is a highly sug-
gestive pretrial procedure, the confidence of the eyewitness will
266. See, e.g., Jack P. Lipton, On the Psychology of Eyewitness Testimony, 62
J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 90 (1977).
267. See, e.g., Clifford & Scott, supra note 213; Michael R. Lieppe et al., Crime
Seriousness as a Determinant of Accuracy in Eyewitness Identification, 63 J. AP-
PLIED PSYCHOL. 345 (1978).
268. Deffenbacher, supra note 213, at 249.
269. Wells, Lindsay & Tousignant conducted studies demonstrating that po-
tential jurors rely heavily on an eyewitness's confidence in determining their credi-
bility. Up to 50% of the variation in jurors' decisions regarding the believability of
an eyewitness can be based on the perceived confidence of the witness. Gary L.
Wells et al., Effects of Expert Psychological Advice on Human Performance in
Judging the Validity of Eyewitness Testimony, 4 L. & HUM. BEHAv. 275 (1980). The
juror's statement in the Leonard Callace case that the certainty of the eyewitness
swayed her to convict is a real-life example of the weight afforded eyewitness testi-
mony. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
270. Deffenbacher, supra note 213, at 258.
271. See supra text accompanying notes 56, 68.
272. Neil v. Biggers, 432 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972).
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in all likelihood be enhanced as a result of the suggestive
procedure. 273
Courts have recognized that determinations of reliability
based on a witness's certainty after the use of suggestive proce-
dures "are complicated by the possibility that the certainty may
reflect the corrupting effect of the suggestive procedures."274
The danger lies in the risk of "having suggestive methods trans-
form an identification that was only tentative into one that is
positively certain."275 However, this inherent danger has not
prevented the courts from finding "sufficient certainty" to sup-
port the reliability of identifications even after suggestive pre-
trial procedures. 276
While many eyewitnesses testify that they were absolutely
positive about their initial identification, 277 courts do not re-
quire this degree of certainty. Courts have found sufficiently
reliable identifications where witnesses said they were "95%
certain"278 and where witnesses only stated that a particular
photograph "looked like" the perpetrator. 279 Courts also recog-
nize that certainty is only one of five factors of admissibility,
and as a result, have found identifications inadmissible despite
273. LoFrus, supra note 7, at 144; Buckhout et al., supra note 25, at 71-72;
Cutler et al., supra note 7, at 244 (biased instructions reduced the accuracy of iden-
tifications and significantly increased the number of false identifications).
274. United States ex rel. Kosik v. Napoli, 814 F.2d 1151, 1159 (7th Cir. 1987);
see also United States ex rel. Hudson v. Brierton, 699 F.2d 917 (7th Cir. 1983);
United States ex rel. Moore v. Illinois, 577 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1978); Escalera v.
Coombe, 652 F. Supp. 1316, 1327 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 826 F.2d 185 (2d Cir. 1987),
cert. granted and vacated on other grounds, 484 U.S. 1054, on remand, 852 F.2d 45
(2d Cir. 1988).
275. Solomon v. Smith, 645 F.2d 1179, 1185 (2d Cir. 1981).
276. Napoli, 814 F.2d at 1159.
277. See, e.g., United States v. Donahue, 948 F.2d 438 (8th Cir. 1991) (witness
was "positively sure" that defendant was bank robber), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1600
(1992); Hakeem v. Beyer, 774 F. Supp. 276 (D.N.J. 1991) (two eyewitnesses posi-
tively identified defendant); People v. Fulcomer, 731 F. Supp. 1242 (E.D. Pa. 1990)
(witnesses were positive in their identifications); Escalera v. Coombes, 652 F.
Supp. 1316 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (where neither witness expressed doubt after selecting
defendant's picture).
278. United States v. Jarrad, 754 F.2d 1451, 1455 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 830 (1985).
279. United States v. Monsour, 893 F.2d 126, 128 (6th Cir. 1990).
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the certainty of the witness when the other factors weighed
heavily against reliability.280
Some rulings, however, seem to contradict both social-sci-
ence research and the confidence factor as it is described in the
Biggers case. As explained above, the Supreme Court in Big-
gers held that courts could use the certainty of the witness at
the time of the confrontation as a predictor of the accuracy of an
identification.28' Implied in the language of Biggers is that the
certainty must be indicated at the first confrontation.
As the Supreme Court recognized in Simmons v. United
States,28 2 once a witness has seen a photograph of a suspect, the
witness is likely to retain in his memory the image from the
photograph, rather than the person actually seen at the
crime.283 The confidence of a witness is bound to increase as the
image of a particular suspect is reinforced by repeated exposure
to a suspect.284
Therefore, if confidence is to be used as an indicator of reli-
ability, courts should look to the confidence of the witness at the
initial confrontation. Certainty developed over time might be a
product of the repeated images, rather than a reflection of a
memory of the crime. Despite this danger, several courts have
found that, even though a witness was tentative and unsure at
280. See, e.g., Marsden v. Moore, 847 F.2d 1536 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 983 (1988).
281. Neil v. Biggers, 432 U.S. 188, 200 (1972); see supra text accompanying
notes 56, 271.
282. 390 U.S. 377 (1973); see supra text accompanying notes 56, 68.
283. Simmons, 390 U.S. at 384.
284. The Supreme Court stated that the danger of misidentification:
will be increased if the police ... show [the witness] pictures of several per-
sons among which the photograph of a single such individual recurs ...
Regardless of how the initial misidentification comes about, the witness
thereafter is apt to retain in his memory the image of the photograph rather
than of the person actually seen reducing the trustworthiness of subsequent
line-up or courtroom identification.
Id.
Using multiple photographs of the same individual in an array or in a subse-
quent corporeal line-up increases the probability that the individual will be se-
lected and also may lead the witness to think that the individual looks familiar
because of the crime, when in fact the individual becomes familiar because of the
repeat images. Evan Brown et al., Memory for Faces and the Circumstances of
Encounter, 62 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 311, 313 (1977); LoF-rus, supra note 7, at 150;
Loftus & Greene, supra note 30, at 332-34.
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the initial confrontation, his or her certainty at a later identifi-
cation made the identification sufficiently reliable to be
admissible.285
VI. Summary and Conclusions
As a result of the Biggers and Manson decisions, courts
must use a two-pronged test to evaluate due process challenges
to identifications based on photo spreads. 28 6 Courts must first
determine whether the pretrial procedure was impermissibly
suggestive. 287 The defendant can challenge procedures in which
there were too few photographs to produce a fair array or where
the array included more than one picture of the defendant. 288
Challenges can also be made if there was collaboration be-
tween witnesses when they viewed the array28 9 or if the police
made any kind of statements or gave instructions that may
have caused the witness to focus on a particular suspect.290 Pro-
cedures may also be suggestive if the type or quality of the pho-
tographs emphasizes a particular picture291  or if the
photographs depict a suspect with distinct characteristics that
draw attention to his or her picture. 292
If a court finds that the pretrial photographic array was not
impermissibly suggestive, then the identification is admissible.
Even if the photographic array was impermissibly suggestive, it
is not automatically excluded. If the court finds, using the five
Biggers factors, that the identification is reliable then it is ad-
missible despite its impermissibly suggestive origins.293
285. See United States v. Woolery, 735 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1984) (admitting
identification as reliable where witness chose someone other than defendant at
initial confrontation but at time of trial displayed certainty); United States ex rel.
Rockman v. DeRobertis, 717 F. Supp. 553 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (holding identification
admissible where witness selected wrong person at pretrial identification but at
trial testified he would never forget defendant's face).
286. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 115 (1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S.
188, 201 (1972).
287. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 117; Biggers, 409 U.S. at 189.
288. See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 98-105 and accompanying text.
290. See supra notes 106-26 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 166-77 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 133-65 and accompanying text.
293. Manson, 432 U.S. at 114-17; Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-200.
856 [Vol. 13:815
42http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol13/iss3/1
DUE PROCESS CHALLENGES
The court's determination of reliability takes into account
the witness's opportunity to view the perpetrator, the witness's
degree of attention, the detail of the witness's original descrip-
tion of the perpetrator, the length of time between the crime
and the identification, and the certainty of the witness.294 So-
cial-science research supports the importance of some of these
factors as predictors of reliability.295 However, confidence of the
witness and detail of description have been shown to be poor
predictors of identification accuracy. 296
Additionally, courts fail to take into account many other
factors that may interfere with the reliability of an identifica-
tion such as post-event information, the forgetting curve, and
the difficulties in cross-racial identification. 297 Even in areas
where researchers and courts are in agreement theoretically,
the practical application of the theory to an actual case often
results in a decision that seems contrary to the empirical
findings. 298
Leonard Callace's case is a good example of the discrepancy
between court rulings and empirical findings. The victim first
identified Callace eighteen months after the commission of the
assault.299 Callace was the only person with a beard in the pho-
tographic line-up. 300 The victim's initial identification, accord-
294. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-200; see supra text accompanying note 56.
295. Longer exposure time enhances reliability. See Laughery et al., supra
note 209, at 477; Shapiro & Penrod, supra note 209, at 141. Greater degree of
attention to the perpetrator enhances identification accuracy. See LoFrus, supra
note 7, at 31-36; Cutler et al., supra note 70, at 240, 244. The shorter the time
interval between the crime and the initial identification enhances the reliability of
the identification. See Lorrus, supra note 7, at 52-53, 68-70.
296. As to the correlation between confidence and accuracy, see generally Clif-
ford & Scott, supra note 213, and Deffenbacher, supra note 213. As to the relation-
ship between description and accuracy see generally Goldstein et al., supra note
214, and Pigott & Brigham, supra note 214.
297. See supra notes 222-23, 250-53 and accompanying text.
298. For example, social-science research has shown that after one year there
is very little ability to identify strangers with whom one had a brief encounter. See
supra note 253. Courts in theory agree that a long time interval between crime
and identification negatively affects the identification. See cases cited supra note
208. However, one court found reliable an identification made four and one-half
years after the crime. See United States v. Samalot-Perez, 767 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.
1985).
299. Falk, supra note 1, at 6; see supra text accompanying notes 4-6.
300. Falk, supra note 1, at 6; see supra text accompanying notes 4-6.
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ing to her own testimony, was not positive.30' One month later
she viewed Callace a second time in a line-up. Police told her
that the suspect was present in the line-up. 3 2 Again, Callace
was the only one with a beard. 30 3 This time the victim did iden-
tify him, and by the time the trial began, she was absolutely
certain he was her attacker. The judge admitted the identifica-
tion evidence over defense counsel's objection. 30 4 The admission
of the evidence indicated that the judge found the identification
to be reliable.
Assuming the trial judge's ruling on reliability was legally
correct, was it in agreement with empirical findings? Empirical
studies demonstrate that the ability to recall a face fades rap-
idly over the course of one year, and by eighteen months the
ability to recognize a face would be minimal.30 5 Studies have
also demonstrated that a photographic spread depicting only
one man with a beard, when the victim had described the perpe-
trator as having a beard, dramatically increases the probability
that that individual will be selected. 306 Following this sugges-
tive procedure with a line-up in which the suspect is the only
person present from the earlier identification further increases
the probability that the witness will select the suspect, because
he is now familiar.307
In Callace's case, he was twice the only suspect in the line-
ups with a beard. Again, empirical studies would predict that
the probability of selecting Callace was increased since he was
the only individual who matched the victim's description of the
perpetrator. 308 Given these circumstances, coupled with empiri-
cal results of eyewitness identification, it would have been
shocking if the witness had not identified Callace as her at-
tacker. By the time of trial, Callace was so familiar to the vic-
tim that she testified that she was absolutely certain he was the
301. See supra note 6.
302. See supra note 6.
303. See supra note 6.
304. Falk, supra note 1, at 6.
305. LoFrus, supra note 7, at 52-53, 68-70; Krouse, supra note 11, at 651.
306. See Luus and Wells, supra note 133, at 55; CLIFFORD & BULL, supra note
27, at 197; Doob & Kirshenbaum, supra note 5, at 289.
307. This has been called a "photo-biased" line-up. See LoFTus, supra note 7,
at 150; Loftus & Greene, supra note 30, at 332-334. See generally Brown et al.,
supra note 31.
308. See supra note 305.
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attacker. 309 But was he familiar to her because of the attack or
because of the subsequent opportunities she had to view him at
length? There is no question now that there was a miscarriage
of justice in the Callace case. The jurors' heavy reliance on the
eyewitness identification was misplaced.
What could have been done to protect Leonard Callace?
Many commentators have treated the question of how the crimi-
nal justice system can counter unjustified reliance on eyewit-
ness identification. Common recommendations include the
requirement of corroboration, 310 the use of special cautionary in-
structions, 311 and the use of expert witnesses to testify about
the problems of eyewitness identification. 312 However, the re-
quirement of strict corroboration has been criticized as being
too drastic. Such a rule would not allow prosecution of a case
based solely on eyewitness identification even when the identifi-
cation was extremely reliable.313 As for the second proposal, the
use of cautionary instructions has been called "a step in the
right direction but not a cure-all."314 Studies show that jurors
309. Falk, supra note 1, at 6.
310. See LoFTus, supra note 7, at 188-89; Frederic D. Woocher, Did Your Eyes
Deceive You? Eyewitness Identification? 29 STAN. L. REV. 969, 1001-02 (1977). In
England, the requirement of corroboration has been recommended. The Home
Secretary of Great Britain appointed a committee to investigate identification pro-
cedures in England after two innocent individuals who had been convicted on eye-
witness testimony alone were pardoned. The Report of the Committee
recommended that juries be instructed "that it is not safe to convict upon eyewit-
ness evidence ... unless . . . supported by substantial evidence of another sort."
LoFTus, supra note 7, at 190 (quoting HER MAJESTY'S STATIONARY OFFICE, THE
DEVLIN REPORT 149 (London 1976)).
311. Lorrus, supra note 7, at 189; Woocher, supra note 310, at 1002;
Rattner, supra note 21, at 292. The cautionary instruction is sometimes referred
to as the Telfaire instruction, after the leading case in which the court established
a model instruction for use in cases where the issue of identity is central to the
case. See United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 558-559 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
312. See LOF-rus, supra note 7, at 191-194; Harmon M. Hosch et al., Influence
of Expert Testimony Regarding Eyewitness Accuracy on Jury Decisions, 4 L. &
HuM. BEHAv. 287, 295 (1980); Rattner, supra note 21, at 292; Wells et al., supra
note 15, at 446; Woocher, supra note 310, at 1006.
313. For example, where the victim personally knew the perpetrator or where
the victim had spent several days with the perpetrator in a kidnap or false impris-
onment case.
314. James P. Murphy, An Evaluation of the Arguments Against the Use of
Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification, 8 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 21, 26
(1987); see also LoFTus, supra note 7, at 189; Woocher, supra note 310, at 1004.
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often do not adequately understand and follow instructions
from the bench.315
Use of eyewitness identification experts has also been criti-
cized as invading the province of the jury,316 misleading or con-
fusing the jury,3 17 unnecessary because the right to cross-
examine the testimony of the eyewitness would reveal any lack
of credibility,318 or unnecessary because the testimony relates to
matters of common knowledge. 319 Despite these criticisms,
studies have demonstrated that expert testimony increases the
amount of attention to eyewitness identification and causes ju-
rors to more closely scrutinize the quality of the identification
evidence. 320
While jurors do not necessarily see eyewitnesses as more or
less credible, they tend to lower the importance of the eyewit-
ness testimony relative to other testimony,32' and discount tes-
timony of witnesses who had poor witnessing conditions. 322
However, many courts are still reluctant to allow into evidence
this sort of expert testimony. 323 Given the defendant's substan-
tial liberty interests, courts should be more open to admitting
315. Edith Greene, Eyewitness Testimony and the Use of Cautionary Instruc-
tions, 8 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 15, 20 (1987). Greene found that a Telfaire instruc-
tion was not effective at cautioning jurors about the problems with eyewitness
testimony; the revised instruction also has its limitations. Id. at 19-20.
316. Rule 704 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides: "Testimony in the
form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it
embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact." FED. R. EVID. 704.
Though the Advisory Committee's notes indicate that it was enacted specifically to
abolish the "province of the jury" concept, some courts continue to refuse to admit
the expert testimony citing grounds very similar to the "ultimate issue" rule. See,
e.g., United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381 (1st Cir. 1979).
317. See, e.g., United States v. Downing, 609 F. Supp. 784 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd,
780 F.2d 1017 (3d Cir. 1985).
318. See, e.g., Moore v. Tate, 882 F.2d 1107 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Christophe, 833 F.2d 1296 (9th Cir. 1987).
319. See, e.g., United States v. Hudson, 884 F.2d 1016 (7th Cir. 1989).
320. Hosch et al., supra note 312, at 294; Elizabeth F. Loftus, Impact of Expert
Psychological Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 65 J. AP.
PLIED PSYCHOL. 9, 9 (1980).
321. Hosch et al., supra note 312, at 294; Wells et al., supra note 15, at 446.
322. Harmon M. Hosch, A Comparison of Three Studies on the Influence of
Expert Testimony on Jurors, 4 L. & Hum. BEHAv. 297 (1980).
323. See, e.g., United States v. Hudson, 884 F.2d 1016 (7th Cir. 1989); United
States v. Christophe, 833 F.2d 1296 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Affleck, 776
F.2d 1451 (10th Cir. 1985); Robertson v. McClosky, 676 F. Supp. 351 (D.D.C. 1988).
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expert testimony in order to overcome the misconceptions that
jurors have about eyewitness identification.
The use of expert witnesses is crucial to a defendant's fair
trial. Expert testimony should be liberally allowed, especially
when the prosecution's case relies significantly on eyewitness
identification. Training trial attorneys how and when to use
this testimony is important. The government should be re-
quired to provide these experts if the defendant cannot afford to
pay for the assistance.
Denial of experts when eyewitness identification is central
to the prosecutor's case would result in a fundamentally unfair
trial. Allowing expert testimony and providing defendants
with this type of assistance would serve one of the main goals of
the criminal justice system: ensuring that citizens like Leonard
Callace are not convicted and punished for crimes they did not
commit.
47
